The Corrigan Law Firm

Lawfirm Keyport, New Jersey

Appellate Litigation

David F. Corrigan is an experienced appellate litigation attorney with a proven record of success. He has achieved significant victories, including reversals of trial court judgments, in the appellate courts. He has argued numerous appeals in both the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey and the United States Courts of Appeal for the Third Circuit. He has also argued successfully at the New Jersey Supreme Court on several employment discrimination case and has prepared and opposed writs of certiorari before the United States Supreme Court.

David commenced his legal career by clerking in the Appellate Division for the Honorable Herman D. Michels, P.J.A.D., who was later the Senior Presiding Judge for the Appellate Division, As a clerk, Corrigan prepared numerous legal memoranda on difficult cases facing the court.

In private practice, Corrigan has argued numerous appeals involving appeals of jury verdicts involving employment issues, civil fraud issues, and numerous constitutional issues. He has also been successful in reversing administrative agency and judicial determinations after non-jury trials.

Appellate Litigation Cases

  • Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth

    Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom., Perkins-Auguste v. Monteiro, 549 U.S. 820. We represented Plaintiff Tony Monteiro, a dissident Elizabeth City Councilman. We prevailed at trial with the jury finding that Councilman Monteiro was removed from a City Council meeting in retaliation for exercising his first amendment rights. The Third Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed the decision by the district court, which had denied the City’s motion for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law after a jury had found in favor of Monteiro on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. In affirming that decision, the Third Circuit held that: (1) the City Council President was not entitled to qualified immunity, even though she could have constitutionally ejected the member if he had disrupted the meeting; (2) the district court did not err by admitting evidence of the member’s acquittal of criminal charges in municipal court; (3) a memorandum regarding ejecting a person from a meeting was admitted as probative circumstantial evidence that the ejection was not based on valid non-discriminatory reasons; and (4) punitive damages were properly awarded since the City Council president acted recklessly and with callous indifference to Monteiro’s rights. The dissenting judge would have reversed the verdict on the grounds of qualified immunity.

  • Forester v. Palmer

    Forester v. Palmer, 401 N.J. Super. 286 (App. Div. 2008). We successfully represented the City Council of the City of Trenton in its suit to oust the City’s Police Director for failing to comply with its residency ordinance. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision that: (1) the Police Director Santiago’s failure to reside in the city violated the residency ordinance; (2) N.J.S.A. § 40A:9-11 required his immediate removal; and (3) a 1987 amendment to the ordinance, which added a provision for waiver of the residency requirement, was invalid and that it was severable from the preexisting residency ordinance. The Appellate Division further upheld the trial court’s determination that since the police director was no longer a city resident, he was required to vacate the position.

  • New Jersey State Firemen’s Mut. Benev. Ass’n v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue

    New Jersey State Firemen’s Mut. Benev. Ass’n v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue, 340 N.J. Super 577 (App. Div.) certif. den. 170 N.J. 88 (2001). We represented the North Hudson Regional Fire and Rescue. The Court found that N.J.S.A. §§ 11A:6-10 and 40A:14-77, which provided for union paid leave to attend certain conventions, was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and was unconstitutional “special legislation”. Therefore, the court determined the Regional properly denied the union’s request for paid leave for its officers

  • Todaro v. County of Union

    Todaro v. County of Union, 392 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div. 2007). We represented Maria Todaro, a County employee who was wrongfully denied a promotion by the County of Union. A jury found in her favor and awarded her substantial damages. However, the trial court refused to promote her as an equitable remedy. The Appellate Division reversed the decision of the trial court, which had found that Todaro was entitled to receive salary and benefits comparable to what the incumbent superintendent was receiving at the time of the hearing, and concluded that this “rightful place” remedy failed to make Todaro whole. The appellate court held that instatement should have been viewed as a priority, even at the expense of the incumbent; that the record did not support the trial court’s findings that the incumbent was an “innocent party” who would be substantially harmed if demoted; and that, even assuming the incumbent was an “innocent party,” he was not vested with a greater entitlement to the position than the employee, the victim of illegal discrimination.

  • Jersey City Board of Education v. New Age Administrators, Inc.

    Jersey City Board of Education v. New Age Administrators, Inc. Docket No. A-1237-93 (Sup. Ct. Hudson County, 1993) We represented the Jersey City Board of Education following the State takeover of its operations. We were successful in a non-jury trial in which Judge Ryan determined that two individuals had defrauded the school district in the amount of 1.3 million dollars. With interest, the judgment was more than 1.7 million dollars. The case was affirmed on appeal and the Supreme Court of New Jersey refused to hear the case.

  • Stryker v. Keelen

    Stryker v. Keelen, We represented Thomas Keelen, a tavern owner. Stryker, his former partner, sued alleging civil fraud. The trial court found in favor of Stryker and awarded substantial damages. We did not handle the trial. We were retained to handle the appeal. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment and dismissed the case. The Appellate Court agreed with us and determined there was insufficient evidence to warrant the verdict.